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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
First, Mr. Loera contends the district court abused its discretion in quashing his subpoena
for certain records under the standard articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 12-13 (2013). The State's arguments for a different standard than the one articulated in
Joy are contrary to the applicable law, and its attempts to distinguish Joy on its facts are

meritless.
Second, Mr. Loera also asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the restitution
award in this case because the State offered no evidence to prove the treatments underlying the
restitution request were to address injuries caused by Mr. Loera's conduct. The portion of the
case on which the State relied to try to counter that argument is actually inapplicable here, as it
dealt with an entirely different issue. Moreover, the portion of that case which does discuss the
causation question at issue in this appeal actually supports Mr. Loera's argument.
Finally, the State has conceded Mr. Loera is entitled to credit for time served. As such, it
has implicitly conceded that the district court erred by not addressing Mr. Loera's motion for that
credit. Accordingly, no further reply is needed on this issue.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Loera's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by quashing Mr. Loera's subpoena duces
tecum.

II.

Whether there was not sufficient evidence to support the award of restitution.

III.

Whether the district court erred by not ruling on Mr. Loera's motion for credit for time
served, particularly since the record bears out his claim.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Quashing Mr. Loera's Subpoena Duces Tecum
The State's response to Mr. Loera's argument about the erroneous decision to quash his
subpoena duces tecum for the STG policies focuses a lot on the way the federal courts interpret
the federal rule regarding quashing subpoenas. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) However, Idaho only looks
to the interpretation of the federal rules when there is no case law discussing the Idaho rule at
issue. See, e.g., State v. Meier, 149 Idaho 229, 231 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Without the benefit of
Idaho case law discussing an Idaho rule, we consider federal cases interpreting a similar
provision of the federal rule.").

In other words, the idea that Idaho looks to the federal

interpretation of similar procedural rules, and even follows it in most cases, refers to a maxim of
interpretation of Idaho's rules, not a doctrinal mandate. See, e.g., Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc.,
136 Idaho 792, 796 (2001) (noting that Idaho applies a different rule than the federal courts
because, even though they were initially identical, a change in the language of the federal rule
justified using a different test). 1

However, when the Idaho Supreme Court has already

interpreted an Idaho rule, that interpretation is controlling.

Therefore, when such an

interpretation exists, there is no reason to look to the federal courts for an alternative
interpretation of the rule.
That is the case with I.C.R. 17(b), as the Idaho Supreme Court has already interpreted the
nature of the district court's discretion under that rule. See State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 12-13

1

Idaho's rule is formatted differently than the federal rule and has some minor variations in
language, but the two are substantively similar. Compare I.C.R. 17(b) with F.C.R. 17(c).
3

(2013). 2

In Joy, the district court quashed a subpoena using the wrong rule, deciding the

evidence sought by the subpoena would not be relevant under I.R.E. 412. Id. at 12. The
Supreme Court explained that decision was improper because, under the proper standard set by
I.C.R. 17(b), the defendant "is entitled to conduct his own review and investigation of the
evidence. Ifhe discovers evidence that he later wishes to offer at trial, the district court will have
an opportunity to consider its relevance at that time.

However, a trial court does not have

discretion to restrict a defendant's access to potentially admissible evidence because some of it
might be irrelevant." Joy, 155 Idaho at 13.
Since Joy has already interpreted the scope of I.C.R. 17(b) and the State has not argued
for this Court to overrule Joy in that regard (see generally Resp. Br.), Joy is the controlling law
with respect to the evaluation of motions to quash under I.C.R. 17(b). As such, the State's
arguments under the narrower federal standard are irrelevant and improper. 3

2

In fact, Joy is the only case to specifically discuss the scope of the district court's discretion
under I.C.R. 17(b). No Idaho case has cited to the federal rule.
3
Even if this Court were to apply the federal test to Idaho's rule, the decision to quash the
subpoena in this case would still be improper. Mr. Loera knew and identified what sort of
particular information he expected to find in the STG policies. (R., p.45; Supp. Tr., p.6,
Ls.13-19.) Therefore, he was not, in fact, engaging in a "fishing expedition." A fishing
expedition refers to a scenario where the party is just hoping that a review of documents will
reveal an unknown claim. See Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148 (Ct. App. 2006) (explaining
that "fishing expeditions" are not allowed in the post-conviction context because the applicable
statute "provides a forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances")
(emphasis added). Since Mr. Loera knew what he expected to find, his subpoena satisfied the
fourth prong of the Nixon standard. Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974)
(refusing to quash the subpoena in that case because the prosecutor had been able to describe the
general nature of what he expected to fmd in the subpoenaed materials).
Mr. Loera's subpoena also satisfied the first three prongs of the federal standard. See id.
at 699-700. To the first prong, the STG policies had potential relevance, not only in terms of
impeachment, but also to part of his defense theory. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 12 (reiterating that a
defendant should be allowed to subpoena evidence which he believes he can use to impeach a
potential witness). To the second prong, the Department of Correction's stance was that any
dissemination of the information in the STG policies would be harmful, and so, it was preventing
anyone from having access to the STG policies at all. (See R., pp.34-39; Supp. Tr., p.4,
4

Although the State has not argued for this Court to overrule Joy, it has tried to argue that
Joy is factually distinguishable from this case. Its arguments in that regard are mistaken. First,

while it is true that the decision in Joy arose from the fact that the district court had applied
I.R.E. 412 instead of I.C.R. 17(b), that does not define the sum total of the Supreme Court's
decision in that case. (See Resp. Br., pp. 7-8.) The defendant in Joy had been acquitted on some
of the charges against him, and the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial on the
remaining charges. Joy, 155 Idaho at 13. Even though one of the acquitted charges was the
primary reason for the discovery request, the Joy Court still held that, despite that acquittal, the
defendant should be allowed to review the evidence sought by the improperly-quashed subpoena.
See id. Therefore, the fact that the district court in this case was applying I.C.R. 17(b) (as

opposed to some other rule), Joy is still applicable because it reveals that the district court's
analysis under Rule 17(b) was not consistent with the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the
State's attempt to disregard Joy on its facts is improper.
Additionally, the State tries to confuse the issue in this case by pointing out that the
subpoena was only partially quashed, and that other witnesses and documents still had to be
produced.

(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)

First, that argument misconstrues the facts.

Below, the

Department of Correction only objected to the portion of the subpoena requesting the STG
policies. (See R., pp.34-36.) Therefore, the district court was not actually asked to review the
propriety of the other requests in that subpoena, or even to determine if they were an adequate

L.12 - p.6, L.2.) Therefore, there was no other way for Mr. Loera to get access to the
information. To the third prong, Mr. Loera needed the actual policies in order to evaluate his
anticipated necessity defense and to prepare his cross-examination of the officers. See also
I.R.E. 1001, et seq. (articulating a preference for the original writing when a party seeks to prove
the contents of a writing).
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substitute for the STG policies themselves. (See generally Supp. Tr.) As such, the State is
asking this Court to affirm the decision to quash on new theory raised for the first time on
appeal, and that unpreserved argument should be rejected. See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho
217, _ , 443 P.3d 231, 238-40 (2019).
At any rate, the other witnesses and documents produced were not sufficient substitutes
for the STG policy itself The Department's position was that any disclosure of the STG policies
was a risk. (R., pp.34-36.) Therefore, it moved to quash release of that information, and it
would not have mattered whether that information was written or oral. Therefore, even though
the other witnesses and documents may have been made available, there is nothing to indicate
that the documents would have included anything about the STG polices or that the witnesses
would have answered questions in that regard. Therefore, the other information disclosed was
not an adequate substitute.
At any rate, there is a preference in the rules of evidence for the original writing to be
presented when the contents of those writings are in question. See generally I.RE. 1001, et seq.
(setting forth this "best evidence" rule, as well as the exceptions to it). Part of the reason for this
preference for the original writing itself is that any witness who testifies to its contents is actually
subject to impeachment by the terms of the policy itself That concern is certainly present in
Mr. Loera's case, where deviation from the actual terms of the policy was the central issue of the
intended defense theory. As such, Mr. Loera still needed the STG policies themselves, even if
the other disclosed information and witnesses might have been able to make disclosures about
the STG policies. Therefore, the State is simply mistaken - the fact that another part of the
subpoena was granted does not make its decision to quash this portion of the subpoena was
proper. See also Joy, 155 Idaho at 13 (explaining that the trial court cannot, under I.C.R. 17(b),
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quash a subpoena (or a portion of a subpoena) simply because it believes that relevant
information will not be found therein).
Finally, the State misconstrues Mr. Loera's arguments regarding the fact that the district
court could have crafted a protective order to reduce the risk of disclosing the STG policies. (See
Resp. Br., p.9 (asserting Mr. Loera's "only talks about materials outside the scope of the motion
to quash").) The State's argument is wrong on its face. Mr. Loera argued that "the district court
could have fashioned a protective order to limit review of the policies to defense counsel and to
prevent its dissemination to others, particularly to other gang members," and "[t]he Department
did not articulate any concern with defense counsel reviewing the policies." (App. Br., p.9
(emphasis from original).) Since the only policies at issue in this case, both below and on
appeal, were the STG policies, Mr. Loera's arguments were obviously discussing a protective
order for the materials which were the subject of the motion to quash, and not to other
information beyond the scope of that motion, to which he had already been given access.
Mr. Loera would also note that the State did not actually refute the merits of his
arguments - that the district court overestimated the risk to the Department of Correction
because it could have crafted a protective order to limit that risk and still allow Mr. Loera to
review the STG policies. (See generally Resp. Br.) As such, it has waived any response in that
regard. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) (explaining a party waives an issue if it fails
to present either argument or authority on that issue). The fact that the district court's decision
was based on this misevaluation of the risk to the State further reveals the abuse of its discretion.
For all these reasons, this Court should reverse the order partially quashing Mr. Loera's
subpoena duces tecum.
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II.
There Was Not Sufficient Evidence To Support The Award Of Restitution

A.

The District Court's Improper Decision To Grant Restitution Expressly Based, In Part,
On PTSD Being An Actual Injury
When the district court granted the State's request for restitution it expressly said: "I will

order restitution unless there's a specific objection to a specific receipt because I think PTSD is a
real injury."

(Tr., p.244, Ls.18-24.)

Nevertheless, the State argues that no restitution was

awarded based on the PTSD justification, and therefore, contends that Mr. Loera' s arguments in
that regard are irrelevant. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Since the State's position is directly contrary
the district court's actual words, its argument represents either a misunderstanding of the district
court's decision in this case, or else, an implicit concession that the district court's consideration
of the PTSD information was erroneous.
More importantly, the State has not addressed the merits of Mr. Loera's argument in that
regard - that there was no evidence to support a restitution award based, in any part, on the
PTSD justification. Therefore, it has waived any response in that regard. Zichko, 129 Idaho at
263. Since the district court expressly based its decision to order restitution, at least in part, on
that improper or unsupported basis, that restitution award should be vacated.

B.

There Is Not Sufficient Evidence Showing The Costs Paid For By The Insurance
Company Were For The Physical Injuries Allegedly Caused By Mr. Loera's Actions
As the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Card, there must be some evidence of

causation to support a restitution award - that the medical costs claimed were for treatments of
the injuries suffered as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct. State v. Card, 146 Idaho
111, 114-15 (Ct. App. 2008).

In its response, the State contends that, because the medical

8

evaluation occurred close in time to the alleged incident, the examination must have been related
to that incident.

(Resp. Br., pp.13-14 (pointing out that the insurance company believed

Mr. Loera was prosecuted in relation to the costs it was covering).) However, Card rejected that
same sort of bare allegation and, instead, required some sort of evidence - "physicians' letters or
notes, hospital records or any medical evidence of any kind indicating . . . that such condition
was causally related to the [criminal conduct]" - to prove that necessary causal connection.
Card, 146 Idaho at 115; accord State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2012) (also

vacating a restitution award because of the lack of evidence of a causal connection between the
damage to a police car and the defendant's criminal conduct). There is no such evidence - no
physician's notes, hospital records, or medical evidence of any kind - to prove the alleged causal
connection in this case. (See generally R.)
The State's reliance on Cottrell in this regard is misplaced because the portion of Cottrell
to which the State was citing (Section D of the opinion) dealt with the question of who can claim
restitution, not the question of causation. (See Resp. Br., p.12 (citing State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho
387, 398-99 (Ct. App. 2012)). In Section D of that opinion, the Cottrell Court addressed the
defendant's argument that, because the injured officer did not have any out-of-pocket
expenditures himself (his insurance company had paid all the costs of treatment), restitution was
improper. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument because, under the plain language of
the statue, when an insurance company covers treatment costs on behalf of a directly-injured
victim, the insurance company then becomes a "victim" for purposes of restitution. Id. at 398-99
(quoting LC. § 19-5304).

Therefore, it held that restitution for the insurance company's

payments on the officer's behalf was proper under the statute. Id. at 399. The Court of Appeals
then considered whether the amounts it requested in that regard were reasonable, and concluded

9

they were because there was no argument that the payments did not conform with the insurance
policy. Id.
Thus, the portion of Cottrell on which the State relied is inapplicable to Mr. Loera's case.
There is no question that, if the insurance company had paid for procedures treating injuries
caused by Mr. Loera's criminal conduct, restitution for those payments would be proper.
However, there is no evidence of the requisite causal connection, and that is what makes the
restitution award in this case improper. See Card, 146 Idaho at 115.
In fact, Cottrell addressed the causation question earlier in the opinion (specifically, in
Section B), and its analysis of that question actually supports Mr. Loera's argument.

See

Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 391-93. Specifically, in regard to the causation question in Cottrell, the
officer had twisted his knee while trying to arrest the defendant, who was resisting arrest. Id. at
390. The officer subsequently had surgery to repair a tom meniscus in that knee. Id. The
causation question centered on whether the tear had been caused by the twisting of the knee
while arresting the defendant, or whether it was due to a pre-existing injury the officer had
suffered. Id. The Court of Appeals held there was sufficient evidence of the causal connection
in that case because the parties had jointly submitted exhibits "which contained an independent
medical evaluation indicating that, notwithstanding the previous swelling and discomfort in
Officer Sullivan's right knee, it was 'more probable than not' that the tear of the lateral meniscus
was a result of the twisting injury occurring on December 12, 2008." Id. at 392-93.
The State presented no such evidence in Mr. Loera's case.

There were no medical

reports to tie the procedures listed in the insurance fund's receipt to the incident with Mr. Loera.
(See generally R.; see also Conf. Docs. (containing no medical records for Officer Phillips);
Conf. Docs. p.124 (Officer Phillips' victim impact statement not mentioning any visit to Saint
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Alphonsus for evaluation of physical injuries from this incident); Con£ Docs., pp.29, 39 (reports
indicating that Officer Phillips was evaluated by prison medical staff and no issues needing
treatment were reported at that time).) In fact, the district court even instructed the prosecutor to
provide additional evidence along those lines. (See Tr., p.244, Ls.18-19; p.245, L.3.) Since the
State never did provide that requisite evidence of the necessary causal connection, the restitution
award in this case was improper. See Card, 146 Idaho at 115; compare Cottrell, 152 Idaho at
392-93. As such, this Court should vacate the restitution award in this case.

III.
The District Court Erred By Not Ruling On Mr. Loera's Motion For Credit For Time Served,
Particularly Since The Record Bears Out His Claim
The State has conceded that Mr. Loera is entitled to credit for time served.

(Resp.

Br., p.14.) In doing so, it has effectively conceded that the district court erred by not ruling on
Mr. Loera's motion for that credit. Therefore, this Court should at least remand this case for
entry of an order granting him appropriate credit in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Loera respectfully requests this Court reverse the order quashing his subpoena duces

tecum, vacate the judgement of conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.
Alternatively, he requests this Court vacate the restitution award and direct the district court to
enter an order granting him 202 days for credit for time served.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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